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ABSTRACT
Black-Box attacks on machine learning models occur when an attacker, despite
having no access to the inner workings of a model, can successfully craft an at-
tack by means of model theft. The attacker will train an own substitute model that
mimics the model to be attacked. The substitute can then be used to design attacks
against the original model, for example by means of adversarial samples. We put
ourselves in the shoes of the defender and present a method that can successfully
avoid model theft by mounting a counter-attack. Specifically, to any incoming
query, we slightly perturb our output label distribution in a way that makes substi-
tute training infeasible. We demonstrate that the perturbation does not affect the
ordinary use of our model, but results in an effective defense against attacks based
on model theft.
1 INTRODUCTION
Think of a situation where a company has invested a lot of resources into training a proprietary
machine learning model and are now giving their customers access to query the model via a paid
API. In this case, the company would like to protect its trained model as intellectual property, both
because of the need to recoup the sunk cost of building it and also because releasing the model in
full could expose privacy-relevant information about the training data. However, recent work has
shown that it is possible for an attacker to extract enough information about the proprietary model
by simply observing its inputs and outputs, such that the attacker can essentialy forge an identical
copy of that model. This procedure is called model theft, where an attacker, without access to some
model, can copy the model by observing input and output to it and then train an own model to mimic
the inaccessible model’s behavior.
We focus on the work of Papernot et al. (2016b) that crafts adversarial samples against a black-box
classifier. An adversarial sample (Szegedy et al., 2013) is an input sample to a classifier model that
has been perturbed in a manner imperceptible to a human, but fools the classifier into assigning a
wrong output label with very high probability. In this context, black-box means that the attacker
does not have access to the internals of the model to be attacked, but can only observe its outputs
to given inputs. Such internals, especially gradient computations, are required by modern methods
to craft aversarial samples. However, by using the property of transferability, meaning adversarial
samples crafted for some model trained on some data are also likely to be adversarial samples for
a second model trained on the same data, the authors can successfully attack the classifier without
the needed internal access. They do this by training a substitute model, for which they do have
internal access, and then use this substitute to craft adversarial samples for the model to be attacked.
This one particular example of model theft, with the end goal to use the copied substitute model to
generate adversarial samples for the black-box.
More than simply observing input and output, Papernot et al. (2016b) introduce a method called
jacobian data augmentation to speed up the process of model theft. Much like the construction of
adversarial samples, the authors carefully craft input samples to the black-box model such that they
will gain maximal information about the model’s decision boundaries from the label response. This
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allows them, after starting with just a tiny labeled seed set (150 examples), to successfully attack the
black-box model after a relatively short time. The authors discuss several strategies to counter their
attack, focusing mainly on methods known to protect against adversarial samples, but do not find
any of them to be successful in fully averting their attack.
In this work, we present a method to reliably counter such black-box attacks based on model theft.
As such, throughout the discussion, we shall view the world from the eyes of the defender. Thus
our model is the black-box to be attacked and the attacker is training a substitute, possibly using
jacobian data augmentation to do so.
Where as all previously proposed countermeasures focus on meddling with the inputs to our model,
we focus on changing its outputs. Since the attacker is actively using our outputs in training the
substitute, this channel of information provides us with the opportunity to launch a counter-attack
by predicting wrong labels to throw off the substitute training. In a sense, we perform a variant of
training set poisoning for the attacker, but rather than poisoning the input data, we poison the labels.
But does this mean that we effectively sacrifice part of our API’s classification accuracy? After
all, our non-malicious customers are paying for the most accurate classification we can offer and
degrading our output labels would be of great disservice to them. To avoid this, we introduce the
only deviation of our setup to the one considered by Papernot et al. (2016b). Where as the previous
authors attack black-box models where only the binary output label is observable, we focus on the
setting where the attacker can observe the output label distribution. We do this for two reasons:
First, this is generally how modern classifier APIs operate, giving not one, but the top k output
labels, each one with some percentage score. Second, this allows us to counter a model thief by
changing our output label distribution such that the effective class prediction (the argmax) remains
unchanged while the distribution itself changes only minimally and any non-malicious consumer
remains unaffected.1
So how do we change our output label distribution to prevent black-box attacks? For this, consider
the fact that to the defender, the attacker’s substitute model is also a black-box that can be attacked
using the exact same method: Train a substitute model for the attacker’s substitute model, call
it a counter-substitute, and use it to craft adversarial examples for the attacker. However, there are
several problems with this approach. First, we need to counter the attacker’s substitute while it is still
in training, meaning that the model itself is non-static and we have no way of knowing how far along
in training it is. Second, we would like to counter any incoming attack from any variety of model,
so it is not enough to simply have a single substitute model as we need to consider entire families of
them. As a consequence, it looks like our only option is to maintain a huge zoo of substitute models,
using different architectures and training each one from multiple initializations for varied amounts
of progress up to convergence, remember all these models and then try to counter-attack all of them.
Here is where we have a trick up our own sleeve. Consider the following question: What is the
attacker’s single objective? To copy our model. Therefore, what is the single best counter-substitute
to any attacker’s substitute model? Our model that they are trying to copy. By crafting adversarial
samples to ourselves, we can reliably throw off any attacker attempting model theft without having to
do any of the additional work of training approrpiate counter-substitutes. Our method is deceptively
simple, can be plugged into any existing classifier and delivers effective protection against model
theft with minimal overhead and without affecting its ordinary use.
2 METHOD
2.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE CRAFTING
In this work, we focus mainly on the Fast Gradient Sign Method proposed in Goodfellow et al.
(2014), both because it is widely used and because Papernot et al. (2016b) found it to be very
effective amongst the methods they explored for performing black-box attacks. Given a model
1Naturally, an effective defense against our counter-attack is therefore for a model thief to simply re-binarize
the output label distribution and revert to the original black-box attack method. While this is certainly true, con-
sider that an attacker can train a substitute much more effectively when matching the output label distribution
than when simply matching the binarized labels, so defending against our counter-attack, though possible, can
be very costly.
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F , a cost function c, and an input-output pair x, y, the Fast Gradient Sign Method constructs an
adversarial example for x as
x∗ = x+  sign(∇xc(F, x, y)) (1)
This maximizes the cost function c while constraining the adversarial perturbation to ‖ • ‖∞ ≤ .
Note that the Fast Gradient Sign Method can be computed easily using a single pass of backpropa-
gation and therefore creates minimal overhead.
2.2 GENERATING THE COUNTER-ATTACK
In order to effectively counter a model thief, we must first define what exactly this means. What we
want is to counter the thief while they are training their substitute model. They do this training by
using some gradient descent method on the weights of their substitute model given the input-output
pairs from our model. Therefore, to throw off the thief’s training procedure, we should focus on
maximally messing up their training gradients. Since gradients tend to get smaller in magnitude as
one approaches a cost function’s optimum, our goal should be to perturb our output label distribution
in such a way that an attacker’s training gradients will be of very large magnitude.
Formally, given a model Fθ with parameters θ, a cost function c, a given input x and our (true)
predicted label distribution yx, our adversarial counter-attack generation process is as follows:
y∗x = yx +  sign(∇y‖∇θc(Fθ, x, yx)‖2) (2)
Of course, in our case, the model Fθ would be our own classifier, since, as explained above, it is
the best counter-substitute for any model thief’s substitute model. By varying , we have a direct
handle on how much of an impact this corruption will have on the quality of our final output. We
have found values as low as  = 0.003 are already enough to mount a successful counter-attack.2
3 EXPERIMENTS
3.1 SETUP
Our experimental setup is akin to Papernot et al. (2016b), except that we don’t attack an actual
public API, since we’re now in the shoes of the defender. Thus, our defending model is a simple
3-layer CNN and we attack it using a variety of substitute models, all using somewhat different
architectures. Table 1 shows the model architectures used. This, again, is done akin to Papernot
et al. (2016b), where we switched out few architectures because we found some of their proposed
architectures to not work in our setting.
We train our defending model on MNIST, achieving an accuracy of roughly 99%. Results on further
datasets are given in the Appendix. As in the original work, the attacker is given 150 labeled samples
of the true data in order to perform bootstrapping and has to perform dataset augmentation to obtain
more samples. We perform 6 rounds of data augmentation, each one doubling the substitute model’s
available dataset in size.
We use the CleverHans library (Papernot et al., 2016a) to generate all adversarial samples. For each
experimental setting we report means and one standard deviation over 10 repetitions.
2Note that, in general, this procedure will not yield a normalized output distribution, which is only partly
relevant, since common APIs classifying among many different class labels usually don’t output the full label
distribution, but only a handful of top scoring labels. In case normalization is important, we describe a number
of normalization methods that we have found to not interfere with the counter-attack in the Appendix. One can
also easily come up with advanced methods for creating adversarial samples that take the normalization and
positivity requirements of the output into account when crafting the samples.
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ID Conv Conv Conv FC FC FC S
X 64 128 - - - - 10
Y 64 128 128 - - - 10
A 32 64 - 200 200 - 10
F 32 64 - 200 - - 10
G 32 64 - - - - 10
H 32 - - 200 200 - 10
I - - - 200 200 200 10
J - - - 1000 200 - 10
K - - - 1000 500 200 10
L 32 - - 1000 200 - 10
Table 1: Substitute model architectures used for the attacker. Conv: Convolutional layer. FC: Fully
connected layer. S: Softmax layer.
3.2 RESULTS
Figure 1 displays the results of our experiments. As can be seen, our proposed counter-attack suc-
cessfully prevents model theft from all considered substitute model architectures. Moreover, it cor-
rupts their training procedure so much that they degrade to little more than random guessing, which
is impressive, considering that most of them achieve a baseline accuracy of above 60% simply after
training on the provided 150 seed examples.
Further, Table 2 shows the fraction of our outputs where the top prediction remains unchanged.
Namely, even when defending against all substitute architectures, over 99.9% of the time our clas-
sifier will still return the same label as being most likely than it would have returned if it hadn’t
defended. This means that our counter-attack is extremely effective while leaving our non-malicous
customers largely unaffected.
ID Argmax unchanged
X 0.999 (0.001)
Y 1.000 (0.000)
A 0.999 (0.001)
F 0.999 (0.001)
G 0.999 (0.001)
H 1.000 (0.001)
I 1.000 (0.000)
J 1.000 (0.000)
K 1.000 (0.000)
L 0.999 (0.000)
Table 2: Results on MNIST. Fraction (mean and standard deviation) of outputs where the argmax of
the adversarial output distribution is equal to the uncorrupted output distribution. Note that for well
over 99.9% of outputs, our top prediction remains unchanged.
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Figure 1: Results on MNIST. Top Row: The black-box classifier’s accuracy on adversarial samples
generated using the attacker’s substitute model. When not defending (left), the classifier suffers
severe degradation in performance compared to its baseline accuracy. However, when actively de-
fending (right), the performance loss non-existent or at most minimal across all attack architectures.
Bottom Row: The substitute model’s accuracy on test set data. When not defended against (left),
the substitute models are able to achieve respectable performance by performing model theft on the
black-box model. But when the defender is performing our proposed counter-attack (right), model
theft is no longer possible and the substitute models degrade to slightly above random guessing.
4 CONCLUSION
We have shown that black-box attacks based on model theft can successfully be averted by gener-
ating adversarial output label distributions that cause a model thief’s training gradients to explode.
The generated perturbations do not influence the ordinary use of the black-box model, in particular
they do not change the top ranked label in the vast majority of cases. Future work can extend our
method by finding a counter-attack method in the case of binary labels, finding systematic ways for
the attacker to avoid being affected by the counter-attack without losing efficiency, as well as defin-
ing an adversarial sample generation procedure that incorporates the normalization and positivity
constraints on the model outputs.
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A RENORMALIZATION STRATEGIES
This section presents methods to transform a generated adversarial output y∗ into a normalized
distribution. Unfortunately, we have found that naively clipping y∗ to [0, 1] and dividing by its
sum will cause the sample to cease to be adversarial. Therefore, we show two methods to perform
normalization that we have found to not interfere with the adversarial-ness of y∗.
A.1 CENTERING THE PERTURBATION
This method alternates between making the adverarial perturbation to be zero mean and clipping the
result to the valid range. We perform the following steps for multiple rounds:
• Let δy = y∗ − y be the adversarial perturbation of y∗
• Let δ¯y = δy −mean(δy) be the centered version of δy
• Let y∗ = y + δ¯y
• Clip y∗ to [0, 1]
The number of rounds needed to reach a satisfiably normalized distribution depends on the value of
 used when generating y∗ initially. We have found that for our experiments, between 2 and 5 rounds
of the above steps produce y∗ with normalization constants off by less than 1/1000 from 1.0.
A.2 WINNER TAKES ALL
This method allocates the missing / excess mass to the lowest / highest parts of the distribution. In
the case of missing mass, meaning
∑
i y
∗
i < 1, we simply allocate the remainder to the lowest entry
of y∗. In the case of excess mass, we reduce the highest entry by the amount needed.
While this method will exactly renormalize the distribution, we have found it to weaken our defense
in some instances.
B RESULTS ON CIFAR10
Figure 2 and Table 3 show results to experiments on CIFAR10 that are equivalent to the ones on
MNIST in the main section.
ID Argmax unchanged
X 1.000 (0.000)
Y 1.000 (0.000)
A 1.000 (0.000)
F 1.000 (0.000)
G 1.000 (0.000)
H 1.000 (0.000)
I 1.000 (0.000)
J 1.000 (0.000)
K 1.000 (0.000)
L 1.000 (0.000)
Table 3: Results on CIFAR10. Fraction (mean and standard deviation) of outputs where the argmax
of the adversarial output distribution is equal to the uncorrupted output distribution. Note that for
well over 99% of outputs, our top prediction remains unchanged.
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Figure 2: Results on CIFAR10. Top Row: The black-box classifier’s accuracy on adversarial samples
generated using the attacker’s substitute model. Bottom Row: The substitute model’s accuracy on
test set data.
C RESULTS ON SVHN
Figure 3 and Table 4 show results to experiments on SVHN that are equivalent to the ones on MNIST
in the main section.
ID Argmax unchanged
X 1.000 (0.000)
Y 1.000 (0.000)
A 1.000 (0.000)
F 1.000 (0.000)
G 1.000 (0.000)
H 1.000 (0.000)
I 1.000 (0.000)
J 1.000 (0.000)
K 1.000 (0.001)
L 1.000 (0.000)
Table 4: Results on SVHN. Fraction (mean and standard deviation) of outputs where the argmax of
the adversarial output distribution is equal to the uncorrupted output distribution. Note that for well
over 99% of outputs, our top prediction remains unchanged.
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Figure 3: Results on SVHN. Top Row: The black-box classifier’s accuracy on adversarial samples
generated using the attacker’s substitute model. Bottom Row: The substitute model’s accuracy on
test set data.
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